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Abstract
The main economic development agency in Chile, CORFO, implemented in 2001 a Seed Capital 
Program (SCP) to promote the development of high-growth firms. The SCP not only provides financial 
aid to entrepreneurs but also technical and administrative assistance through the support of incubators. 
Incubators may be universities incubators (UI) or private firms (NUI). The aim of this paper is to know 
the performance of beneficiaries according to the assistance of UI or NUI. A total of 238 new firms 
beneficiaries with the CORFO program were surveyed (84 supported by UI and 154 supported by NUI). 
Two logistic regression models were used, a first model to assess the probability that a new firm achieves 
positive sales, and a second model to assess the probability that the new firm reaches a high growth during 
the first five years from its inception. Overall, mixed results were found. SCP’s beneficiaries supported 
by either UI and NUI have the same probability of having positive sales when starting their operations. 
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Introduction
To foster the development of entrepreneurship, support of the public sector is essential to 
identify and leverage high impact results and reduce the impact of important issues affecting 
the entrepreneurial activity. One issue is the difficulty to obtain new financial resources for 
growing due to the asymmetries faced by private investors to judge the quality and estimate 
the value of the business ideas (Fairchild, 2011; Audretsch, 2012). Another important issue is 
the lack of administrative and managerial skills of entrepreneurs hindering the growth of their 
businesses (Cancino et al., 2015).
Responding to the challenges of project valuation and administration, and hence support 
a greater number of entrepreneurships, CORFO (Production Development Corporation) 
introduced in 2001 a Seed Capital Program (SCP) aiming to reduce funding problems, and to 
guide the entrepreneurs in the foundation and start up of high-growth potential businesses in 
Chile. According to Kantis and Díaz (2008), a high-growth entrepreneurship is defined as one 
that is born as a micro business, but grows rapidly into a Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) 
during its first five years of existence. CORFO’s SCP selects business ideas with high growth 
potential, and supports the entrepreneurs with a non-reimbursable subsidy (from US$13.000 
to US$86.000 per business idea), to provide not only cash flows, but also technical and 
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administrative aid. The technical and administrative support is indirectly facilitated by CORFO 
through business incubators, which either reside in universities (University Incubators, UI), or 
are private firms assisting business incubation and startups (Non-Universities Incubators, NUI). 
Both, UI and NUI receive the funds from CORFO associated to the entrepreneurs benefited 
with the SCP and provide technical and administrative support, regardless of the entrepreneurs’ 
results. It has been registered that incubators tend to submit projects to the SCP, not all of 
which are necessarily business ideas with high growth potential. The incentive scheme for the 
incubators that receive their own income based on the number of projects funded by CORFO 
may distort the results if their purpose is to maximize their own income, rather than the results 
of the entrepreneurship. Then our motivation is to test if differences to select projects to be 
funded by the SCP can be found between both schemes:
Scheme 1: Entrepreneurs, Public Agency (CORFO) and University Incubators (UI)
Scheme 2:  Entrepreneurs, Public Agency (CORFO) and Private Incubators (NUI).
In order to contrast the outcomes of the implementation of SCP with the participation of UI 
and NUI, two models of logistic regression were applied. The analysis of the results for both 
models suggests interesting findings. The first model identified no differences regarding the 
support from UI versus NUI in terms of the probability of initiating sales by a new company. In 
other words, the scheme 1 is neither better nor worse than scheme 2 at predicting the probability 
that a business supported by CORFO’s SCP will start up. The second logistic model suggests 
interesting results ascribing scheme 1, indicating that the entrepreneurs that received CORFO’s 
SCP through UI presented a higher probability of growing rapidly than scheme 2, selling 
US$100.000 or more annually before the fifth year since the company foundation. This could 
be interpreted in the way that UI would support or choose entrepreneurs better than NUI. The 
agency problems that CORFO has with incubators would be much more significant regarding 
NUI, compared to UI. The results from the logistic regression models may provide evidence in 
support the thesis in which the collaboration of the three actors university-government-industry 
creates a virtuous circle.
Literature review and hyphoteses
In recent years the scientific literature has been quite extensive on topics such as the 
growth of new and small companies, program for supporting their innovation activities and the 
promotion of production through public programs (Cumming, 2007; Collewaert et al., 2010; 
Norrman and Bager-Sjögren, 2010; Cancino, 2014; Román et al., 2017; Cancino et al., 2018). 
This is how the studies on innovation and entrepreneurship grow and grow over time (Cancino 
et al., 2017 a,b; Cancino & Coronado, 2014). 
For example Cumming (2007) analyzes 280 Australian venture capital funds and their 
investments on 845 new ventures (period 1982-2005). The data analyzed show that the program 
facilitated investment in new companies, particularly in the early stages and that could be 
classified as high technology, as well as the provision of monitoring and value added advice 
to the participating companies. Likewise, Collewaert et al. (2010), in a study for Belgium, 
evaluated whether public intervention through a program of subsidies of angel networks 
improves economic growth in the Flanders region. The results show that, first, business angels’ 
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networks reduce information and financing problems for enterprising companies. Second, there 
are positive indicators of future potential in terms of the ability to raise and raise new funds, 
provided they are technology-intensive companies (Cancino & Bonilla, 2011).
On the other hand, Norrman and Bager-Sjögren (2010) studied a program of the Swedish 
Innovation Center (SIC) that provided support to innovators in their early stages of development 
through the delivery of financial capital, advice and networks. The period of this study was 
between 1994 and 2003. The results indicate that the impact of the support to undertakings 
in the early stages given by the public program of the SIC is weak or non-existent. The focus 
of the program was not necessarily on innovative or high-tech companies. Other studies on 
applied programs in developed economies show mixed results in terms of the success of public 
intervention to encourage a greater number of ventures (Luukkonen, Deschryvere and Bertoni, 
2013, Munari and Toschi, 2014).
According to Bonilla and Cancino (2011), in the case of Latin America, several studies 
have been developed that analyze the results of public productive support programs.
For instance, Álvarez and Crespi (2000) analyzed a program for promoting the export 
development of Chilean firms. Analyzing the results of companies supported by the program 
in the nineties, they found a positive effect on the technological innovation of the exported 
products and in particular on the number of agreements reached by the companies that go 
through the Program. They also found that the program does not seem to have significant 
results in terms of quantitative increases in the types of products exported.
Benavente and Crespi (2003) studied the impact on companies that participated in a program 
that provides strategic partnerships for small businesses in Chile (PROFO). The results indicate 
that PROFO has a positive impact on intermediate results (planning, marketing strategies, 
training), but they have a minor impact on the total productivity of the factors.
In a study for Mexico, Tan and López-Acevedo (2005) analyzed the impact of the program 
CIMO (Center for International Mobility) and focused on the training and training of workers 
of different size companies. small and medium. The authors observed a positive impact for the 
first cohort 1991 - 1993 on the intermediate results, compared to the control group, with respect 
to investment for training and also for the adoption of quality control processes the companies 
that received the treatment. In contrast, mixed results were obtained for the second cohort 1993 
- 1995 (Bonilla & Cancino, 2011).
In all the above-mentioned programs, the participation of public productive support 
agencies can be observed, supporting private entrepreneurs so that their businesses can grow, 
develop a greater number of innovations or participate in international markets. Normally, the 
relationship between public agencies and private entrepreneurs is not direct. Public agencies 
provide financial, administrative or technical assistance through third parties, generally known 
as business incubators, which can be defined as private firms that seek to benefit from public 
programs by attracting and supporting entrepreneurs with high growth potential (Díaz de León 
& Cancino, 2014).  Generally, a good public program design should generate an adequate 
contract between the interests of business incubators and the growing results of entrepreneurs 
supported by public programs. The objective of a program should be for companies to grow, and 
not just increase the number of beneficiaries. A bad design, on the other hand, could generate 
an opportunistic model for business incubators, where the objective would be to attract as 
many beneficiaries of the programs as possible. Finally, for the business incubators, it would 
not matter the real quality or growth opportunity of each beneficiary, but only to support the 
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maximum possible of them. So capture the highest possible fee for serving and supporting new 
entrepreneurs. 
Seeing the potential problem of agency that occurs between business incubators and 
the interests of public programs of productive support, is that many public agencies have 
developed programs where incubators are not only private firms, but are incubators belonging 
to universities. The participation of university incubators seeks to eliminate the agency problem 
mentioned above, since protecting the brand and reputation of the universities could limit the 
opportunistic behavior of those university business incubators that must be aligned with the 
objectives of public agencies.
This new relationship of private entrepreneurs, public productive support agencies and 
university incubators, could be a form or scheme of triple helix type relationship, where the 
performance of the three actors, could be much more advantageous than the relationship of 
private with public agencies. It will be interesting to know some definitions of a triple helix 
scheme to know the potential effects of this type of relationship.
According to Etzkowitz (2007), a model that could be effective in promoting the creation 
and dissemination of knowledge to promote the development and growth of new businesses is 
the triple helix model. The thesis of this model is that the potential for innovation and economic 
development in a knowledge society lies in a more prominent role for the university and in the 
hybridization of elements from university, industry and government to generate new institutional 
and social formats for the production, transfer and application of knowledge. This vision 
encompasses not only the creative destruction that appears as a natural innovation dynamics, but 
also the creative renewal that arises within each of the three institutional spheres of university, 
industry and government, as well as at their intersections (Ranga & Etzkowitz, 2013). 
The recognition of universities as producers of knowledge and as a key factor in the 
innovation systems is addressed by many authors (Etzkowitz & Ranga, 2010; Rodrigues & 
Melo, 2012), posing a clear evolution in their role; firstly seen as an ‘ivory tower’, concentrating 
only on its traditional research and teaching tasks, apart from a rather social role or relevant 
participation in regional economy than an agent of change, generator of knowledge and engine 
for innovation systems, surpassing the industry as primary resource of economic and social 
development to the long term.
Despite most of the literature showing studies conducted in the behavior of innovation 
systems and triple helix applications and the role of university with an entrepreneurial focus in 
developed countries (Almeida, 2008; Guerrero et al., 2014; Etzkowitz et al., 2005; Rodrigues & 
Melo, 2012), there is a body of literature on applications of the triple helix model in developing 
countries. Authors like Charles (2003), Bernasconi (2005), Saad and Zawdie (2011) and Tiffin 
and Kunc (2011), address the relevance of the role of the university as a source of knowledge 
and driving innovative initiatives with potential towards economic growth and regional 
innovation systems in developing countries. 
CORFO in Chile and a potential triple helix scheme
The national innovation systems phenomenon drives governments from developing 
countries to create policies that encourage the development of alliances among three spheres. 
In Chile, the development of a hybrid triple helix scheme trying to encourage the development 
of new high-growth businesses is observed. The Chilean government, through the Seed 
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Capital Program (SCP) of CORFO seeks to provide financial assistance to entrepreneurs with 
innovative ideas and want to grow, besides helping them with the delivery of technical and 
administrative assistance through business incubators, many of which are universities that 
support with knowledge and skills to new businesses. 
CORFO´s SCP was created in 2001 with the objective of promoting the appearance of new 
entrepreneurship through the allocation of funding for innovative business projects in Chile. 
Currently, the SCP has two lines of action: Line 1 and Line 2. Line 1, named Seed Capital 
for pre-investment studies, is a subsidy to support definition and formulation of innovative 
business projects. Line 2, called Seed Capital supporting implementation, is a subsidy that 
allocates resources for launching and implementation of innovative projects with high growth 
expectations. 
CORFO finances up to 90% of the amount required for the execution of a project in Line 
2, with a maximum of US$80.000.-, non-reimbursable. This subsidy also finances activities 
for: industrial and intellectual property protection; market analysis; business plan updates; 
specialized assistance in the fields of marketing and strategy; among others. In addition, it also 
funds changes of infrastructure, property leasing, commercial packaging of products including 
packaging design, manufacture of user´s manuals, product certification, brand design, sample 
production, etc. In order to participate in SCP each entrepreneur must have a counterpart, which 
can be an intermediary, a business incubator, or any organization enrolled in CORFO and able 
to provide intellectual capital, i.e. technical and administrative support. Business incubators are 
typically universities (UI) or private consulting firms registered in CORFO (NUI). The SCP 
includes a mandatory fee that the entrepreneur must pay to the incubator equivalent to US$1,000 
per month, with a limit of US$12,000 per year. The main objective of an incubator, both UI and 
NUI, is to support entrepreneurs during the creation, implementation and development of their 
firms, providing timely means to increase their chance of success. 
Hypothesis 
The above situation, where entrepreneurs can be supported by both UI and by NUI, brings 
an interesting question, especially if we want to test the value of the triple helix model in a 
developing country. Entrepreneurs assisted by UI can have better results than those supported 
by NUI? In order to try to answer this question, let us study the case of SCP of CORFO and its 
relationship with incubators through the agency theory1.
It would be possible to think that the NUI, being also private, seek to maximize their own 
objectives rather than those who want to maximize CORFO, so instead of working hard to find, 
select and empower entrepreneurs with the best business ideas, try maximize the number of 
entrepreneurs who support, earning a fixed salary for each assisted entrepreneur, rather than 
promote only the best ideas. Meanwhile, the UI, which do not necessarily seek more financial 
income from CORFO, but gaining prestige and developing good business case to improve its 
competitive position as a university, might be more aligned to meet the objectives of CORFO’ 
1 According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), an agency relationship is a contract under which one person (the 
principal) engages another person (the agent) to perform a service on their behalf, which involves delegating some 
decision-making authority to the agent. If both parties in the relationship are utility maximizers, there is good reason 
to believe that the agent will not always act in the best interests of the principal. Due to the non-existence of adequate 
control by the principal-agent over the agent, or establishing clear initiatives, which ensure major congruence of objec-
tives, naturally the agents want to maximize their own profits, over the principal-agents’.
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SCP, showing fewer problems agency. One could expect based on the triple helix and agency 
problems literature that the relationship between CORFO (government), the entrepreneur 
(private) and UI (university) would be richer than the relationship between CORFO, an 
entrepreneur and a NUI.  So our hypotheses are:
H1: Participation of UI in CORFO`s SCP, instead of NUI, increases the probability that 
entrepreneurs generate sales.  
H2: Participation of university incubators in SCP, instead of NUI, increases the probability 
of high growth entrepreneurships.
 
Data and research method
The data from this study is drawn from a CORFO database of the SCP Line 1 and Line 2. 
The dataset includes a sample of 238 firms beneficiaries of CORFO’s SCP between 2001 and 
2007. The dataset provides contact information for these firms, which were contacted by phone, 
e-mail or in person to fill out a survey (see appendix 1). Out of the 238 firms who received 
the SCP subsidy, only 136 remain in place today, with permanent sales and good financial 
results, even though there is a wide variability in terms of growth level. From the remaining 
102 benefited firms commercial operations or tax payments are unknown, and it is clear that 
sales were never accomplished. 
Using this data, the research method considers two logistic or logit regression models to test 
the defined hypotheses and to study the factors associated with the success of an entrepreneur. 
The logit model that we will further develop takes its name from the logistic distribution 
function. Its concrete form is as follows:
where X is the matrix that contains the independent variables and b is the parameter vector to 
be estimates. We will use the maximum likelihood method for estimation, as is typical in these 
cases (Davidson & Mackinon, 1992). The likelihood function to be maximized is given by:
where yi = Xi b is the realization of the binary dependent variable. In our case, this binary 
variable equals 1 when the firm is a born global and 0 when the company internationalizes 
gradually.
In the first logistic regression model we studied the distinction between those who generate 
some volume on sales, i.e. achieve success in the industry and survive, from those who do 
not generate an adequate volume of sales to survive. While in the second logistic regression 
model we assess the probability that a beneficiary of CORFO’s CSP becomes a high growth 
entrepreneur according to the influence of a number of variables including the advice of an 
incubator. A summary of the key variables is presented in Table 1.
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Dummy variable takes a value of 0 for no and 1 for yes. 
Dummy variable takes a value of 0 for no and 1 for yes  
Continuous variable ranging from 0 to 40
Dummy variable takes a value of 0 for no and 1 for yes
Categorical variable takes value of 1 for food, 2 for biote-
chnology, energy, and environmental, 3 for education, 4 
for manufacturing, 5 for mining and infrastructure, 6 for 
multisectorial, 7 for health, 8 for TIC, 9 for trade, and 10 
for  tourism.
Dummy variable takes a value  of 0 for low technology 
and 1 for   high tech  
Dummy variable takes a value of 0 for female and 1 for 
male  
Categorical variable takes value of 1 for compulsory 
education, 2 for higher education, and 3 for postgraduate 
education
Continuous variable ranging from 0 to 44
Dummy variable takes a value of 0 for no and 1 for yes
Dummy variable takes a value of 0 for no and 1 for yes  
Dummy variable takes a value of 0 for no and 1 for yes
Continuous variable ranging from 6,250,000 to 
277,000,000
Description
Has survived the organization?
Is the organization a dynamic 
entrepreneurship?
Total number of workers
Is the organization exporting?
Industrial sector
Level of technology in the sector
Gender
Educational level
Years of work experience
Previous entrepreneurship efforts
Located in the metropolitan region
University incubator?








The first logistic regression model describes the beneficiaries who were successful in their 
business from those who were not. The success is measured through the level of sales and if 
they were able to survive. Therefore, the dependent variable for the model is a binary variable 
for sales (0= no success (do not show permanent sales), and 1= success (with permanent sales)). 
In this first model the independent variables are: Sector (it is a categorical variable that 
takes value of 1 for food, 2 for biotechnology, energy, and environmental, 3 for education, 4 
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for manufacturing, 5 for mining and infrastructure, 6 for multisectorial, 7 for health, 8 for TIC, 
9 for trade, and 10 for  tourism), Techonology (it is a dummy variable that takes a value  of 0 
for low technology  business and 1 for high tech), Gender (it is a dummy variable that takes a 
value of 0 for female and 1 for male), Education (it is a categorical variable that takes value of 
1 for compulsory education, 2 for higher education, and 3 for postgraduate education), Work_
exp (it is a continuous variable ranging from 0 to 44, according to the years of experience), 
Entrepreneurship (it is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the entrepreneur has developed 
previous entrepreneurships, and 0 otherwise), Region (Dummy variable takes a value of 1 
if the firm office is located in metropolitan region, Santiago, and 0 other region), Incubator 
(dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the beneficiary is supported by University incubator, 
and 0 otherwise), and Capital_assigned (it is a continuous variable ranging from 6,250,000 to 
277,000,000 according to the subsidy provided by CORFO). 
Second logistic model
The dependent variable for the second model is another binary variable named Gazelle that 
assess the ability of a firm to be defined as a high-growth entrepreneurship, where 0 indicates 
non a high-growth entrepreneurship, and 1 represents a high-growth entrepreneurship. 
The independent variables for this second model are: Workers (it is a continuous variable 
ranging from 0 to 40 according to the total number of workers), Sector (it is a categorical 
variable that takes value of 1 for food, 2 for biotechnology, energy, and environmental, 3 for 
education, 4 for manufacturing, 5 for mining and infrastructure, 6 for multisectorial, 7 for 
health, 8 for TIC, 9 for trade, and 10 for  tourism), Techonology (it is a dummy variable that 
takes a value  of 0 for low technology  business and 1 for high tech), Gender (it is a dummy 
variable that takes a value of 0 for female and 1 for male), Education (it is a categorical variable 
that takes value of 1 for compulsory education, 2 for higher education, and 3 for postgraduate 
education), Work_exp (it is a continuous variable ranging from 0 to 44, according to the years of 
experience), Entrepreneurship (it is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the entrepreneur 
has developed previous entrepreneurships, and 0 otherwise), Region (Dummy variable takes a 
value of 1 if the firm office is located in metropolitan region, Santiago, and 0 other region), and 
Incubator (dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the beneficiary is supported by University 
incubator, and 0 otherwise)
Results 
To assess the factors that are playing an important role in explaining the success of a firm 
financed by the SCP Line 1 and Line 2 a logistic regression model was estimated. The results 
are presented in Table 3.




Sector (base 1 = food)
  2 = biotechnology, energy, environmental
  3 = education
  4 = manufacturing
  6 = multisectorial
  7 = health
  8 = TIC
  9 = trade
  10 = tourism
Techonology (0 =low tech, 1=high tech)
Gender (0 =female, 1=male)
Education (base 1= compulsory education)
  2 = higher 
  3 = postgraduate 
Work_exp 
Entrepreneurship (0 = no, 1= yes)
Region (0 = no, 1 = yes)






-13.092   
-0.009   
0.460   
-0.686   
-1.565   
-13.869   
-0.494   
-2.111   
13.405   
-0.008   
0.671   
-0.586   
0.036   
2.612   
0.149     
-0.408   
0.000   





























































First Logistic Regression Model
Z-score indicates significance level as follows: ***p≤0.01, **0.01<p≤0.05, *0.05<p≤0.10
In the logistic regression model presented in Table 3, there are three variables that were 
statistically significant: the touristic sector, entrepreneurship, and the capital assigned.  The 
results suggest that being in the touristic sector is negatively associated with the probability 
of being successful in the business. On the other hand, having previous entrepreneurship 
efforts increases the probability of success with their new business, and increases in the capital 
assigned also increases the probability of success. According to Table 3, the incubator variable 
was not statistically significant, indicating that there is not a difference in the success of an 
entrepreneur if receives advice from a NUI or an UI. Thus, we reject the first hypothesis that an 
UI may influence more in a project financed by the SCP. 
Importantly, the results of this first model show that having experience in previous start-
ups, and be able to raise capital through other funding sources, such as banks, private investors, 
among others, may be an important variable to increase the likelihood of having a successful 
business. The negative effect of the variable measuring the touristic Sector is interesting. The 
involvement of projects funded by CORFO’s SCP in this sector decreases the probability of 
generating sustainable sales over time to succeed and stay in business.
Table 4 presents the results of the second logistic regression model that assess the probability 
of being a high-growth entrepreneur. 






Sector (base 1 = food)
  2 = biotechnology, energy, environmental
  3 = education
  4 = manufacturing
  6 = multisectorial
  7 = health
  8 = TIC
  9 = trade
  10 = tourism
Techonology (0 =low tech, 1=high tech)
Gender (0 =female, 1=male)
Education (base 1= compulsory education)
  2 = higher 
  3 = postgraduate 
Work_exp 
Entrepreneurship (0 = no, 1= yes)
Region (0 = no, 1 = yes)






1.190   
-11.342   
2.266   
-0.568   
0.044   
-1.555   
-10.139   
-2.103   
-1.078   
10.893   
-1.672   
-0.735   
-0.818   
0.030   
1.466    
0.237    
1.125   




5.22   
2.03   
-0.01   
1.05   
-0.60   
0.06   
-0.96   
-0.01   
-1.42   
-0.87   
0.01   
-2.28   
-0.89   
-0.79   
1.29   
2.76   
0.52   
2.47   










































Second Logistic Regression Model
Z-score indicates significance level as follows: ***p≤0.01, **0.01<p≤0.05, *0.05<p≤0.10
The results in Table 4 shown that there are five variables that were statistically significant: 
number of workers, exports level, gender, having previous entrepreneurship and type of 
incubator. The results from the logistic model suggest that increases in the number of workers 
increases the probability of having a high-growth entrepreneurship. At the same time, if the 
organization is exporting increases the probability of having a high-growth entrepreneur. 
Contrary, being a male decreases the probability of a high-growth entrepreneurship but having 
a previous start-up increases the probability of being a high-growth entrepreneur. Finally, the 
positive effect of being an UI implies a higher probability that an entrepreneur, transforms his/
her business into a high-growth entrepreneurship.
In this second model we see a positive and statistically significant influence regarding the 
participation of an UI supporting businesses in order to become high-growth entrepreneurships. 
Therefore, there is no evidence to reject the second hypothesis about the benefits of having 
participation of UI in CORFO’s SCP to increase the probability of the emergence of high-
growth entrepreneurships, instead of NUI.
Discussion of results and limitations
The size reached by projects financed by CORFO’s SCP, through UI is much higher than 
the size of projects supported by NUI. This outcome allows us to infer that many NUI are 
focused on small projects which, in the data, do not exhibit a potential of scalability consistent 
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with growth rates for high-growth firms, therefore, in the attribute “scalability of projects”, UI 
show a better performance than NUI.
It seems that the support and selection of institutions related to universities, which are 
bigger, more complex and prestigious than NUI, have a major capacity to attract high impact 
projects. This is probably linked to the reputation and visibility of these organizations, which 
gives greater public recognition and exposure, counting on a higher budget for advertising, 
more networks and better access to relevant experiences than a NUI. Also it can be argued that 
UI play a more social role than their private peers, supporting innovative projects with a high 
impact potential, due to their obligation to comply with an institutional mission for the creation 
of knowledge, and not only generate actions to develop good business, but particularly those 
able to generate a greater impact on our society.
From the agency theory point of view, and regarding the initial discussion of our work, 
we can analyse that the choice of beneficiaries from UI is more aligned with the objectives 
which CORFO’s SPC seeks, than the choices its peers make, NUI, about the beneficiaries who 
apply to the program. Maybe, the fact that the incubators receive fixed payment, in any case, 
by the beneficiaries that are accepted by CORFO’s SCP activates a control problem, where 
certain incubators could develop opportunistic behaviour, trying to maximize the number of 
projects they support, instead of efficiently strengthening the entrepreneurs who seek growth 
opportunities.
Changing the type of contract with the incubators, for instance, not making a fixed payment 
for each entrepreneur benefited by the program, but instead paying incubators according to 
the results they obtain (for example. according to the sales volume, personnel hired or capital 
raised), would allow supporting the alignment and congruence of the incubator objectives with 
the CORFO program mission and objective.
Why is it difficult to align CORFO and the incubators’ interests with a fixed payment 
model? The conflict of interest between the principal-agent and the agent is clear in this case. 
In the case of the UI, the results of this study would show that their objectives are more aligned 
with CORFO’s SCP. The above, most likely given by the higher reputational cost that UI have 
of being discovered maximizing their interests over the principal (considering the university 
brand). While the current approach of contracts between CORFO and its incubators is not 
adjusted or modified, the major reputational control put on incubators could strengthen the 
biggest congruence of objectives with CORFO, undermining the minor alignment of private 
incubators. In this logic, we identified the positive relation produced when University, 
Government and Entrepreneurs collaborate to obtain relevant outcomes by developing and 
promoting the birth and development of dynamic enterprises, with high impact and growth, 
which can be the path to maximize the economic growth and welfare in an economy. It is 
particularly important to highlight that public programs for productive support –which not only 
give economic resources to entrepreneurs, but also technical and administrative support- could 
work much better if universities were also considered in the model, particularly like centers 
for the creation and dissemination of knowledge and good practices. The above mentioned 
is another example of the positive effects of the triple helix model supporting the productive 
forces in each country.
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Conclusions
The objective of this paper was to explore the results from public support to privates through 
CORFO’s SCP in Chile, comparing the results of new businesses advised by UI versus NUI. 
The central hypothesis of this study examines whether the CORFO’s SCP has better results 
to follow a scheme private entrepreneurs, public agencies and university incubators versus 
one that does not include universities. The results of the study provide valuable information 
so that policy makers can increase the number of programs that consider the participation 
of universities, complementing entrepreneurs’ knowledge and experience, towards the 
development of a greater number of high-growth entrepreneurships in each economy. Through 
these results, public support could be more effective and less faced with poor results, where 
entrepreneurships with incremental innovations are mainly supported, that is, with a low impact, 
compared with radical innovations, which could show greater growth potential. Universities, in 
this sense, could be generating a better selection process, or at least a more critical one, by not 
withstanding any kind of project, except those with a greater growth potential. In the context 
of our work, when the government provides economic resources to private incubators, through 
CORFO’s SCP, the results in terms of sales volume are much better, if those who select the 
projects to be presented to CORFO are UI instead of NUI, and thus, it is possible to define an 
example of value to the triple helix model, particularly in the context of developing countries. 
A second option for CORFO would be to change the type of contracts it has with incubators, 
making a lower monthly payment for each beneficiary of the program, plus a variable payment 
according to results that the new supported businesses obtain. This would also be a way of 
supporting the alignment and congruence of the incubator objectives according to CORFO’s 
program mission and objective.
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